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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Joshua Paul Kagarice appeals from the district court's order on intermediate appeal
reversing the magistrate's order dismissing the charge against him.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Kagarice with unlawful arrest, a misdemeanor. (R., pp. 10-11.)
The complaint alleged that Kagarice arrested or detained Courtney Madsen "without ...
lawful authority." (R., p. 10.) The police report, incorporated into the affidavit of probable
cause, stated that Kagarice, an Idaho State Police officer, and Madsen were back-fence
neighbors, but had not interacted and did not know each other. (R., pp. 12, 15-16.)
Kagarice' s wife called him "at the end of his scheduled shift" and complained of noise
because a car alarm was going off from Madsen's property. (R., pp. 15, 23.) Kagarice
tried to make contact with someone at the residence, but no one answered the door. (R.,
pp. 15-16, 23.) While Kagarice was present the car alarm stopped, apparently because the
battery on the car ran down. (R., p. 24.) Kagarice contacted Madsen several hours later,
when he went back on shift, and arrested her for resisting and obstructing an officer when
she refused to give him her last name or exit her house when ordered. (R., pp. 15-17, 2325.)
Kagarice moved to dismiss the unlawful arrest complaint. (R., pp. 117-139, 14565, 215-21.) The magistrate granted the motion on two grounds: First, the court held that
Madsen had a legal duty to identify herself, and therefore the arrest for resisting and
obstructing for refusing to give her name was lawful. (5/18/18 Tr., p. 9, L. 9 - p. 11, L.
25; R., pp. 228-29.) Second, the magistrate held that dismissal was proper as a sanction
1

for failing to include in the affidavit of probable cause the fact that there had been a finding
of probable cause in Madsen’s resisting case. (5/18/18 Tr., p. 12, L. 7 – p. 14, L. 12; R.,
pp. 228-29.) The state filed a timely notice of appeal to the district court. (R., pp. 231-33.)
The district court reversed. (R., pp. 299-365.) The district court concluded
Kagarice lacked probable cause to believe Madsen was resisting or obstructing the lawful
exercise of his duties by failing to provide her name in relation to the nuisance of the car
alarm because the nuisance had abated and therefore the ordinance neither required nor
allowed personal service of a notice to abate, and therefore Madsen had no lawful duty to
provide her last name. (R., pp. 309-352.) The district court also found that the submission,
in Kagarice’s case, of the unsigned finding of probable cause related to Madsen’s case was
both factually and legally insufficient to support the order of dismissal. (R., pp. 352-62.)
Kagarice filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 366-70.)

2

w
Kagarice presents no issues for appellate review.
state

1.

submits the issues

2.

brief.)

The

as:

Did Kagarice lack authority t0

arrest

her refusal t0 provide her

name

committed

(E Appellant’s

last

Madsen

for resisting

and obstructing because

did not give rise to probable cause that she

that crime?

Did the district court correctly reverse the magistrate because dismissal 0f the
charge was an improper sanction as a matter of fact and law?

ARGUMENT
I.

Kagarice Lacked Authority T0 Arrest Madsen For Resisting

A.

And

Obstructing

Introduction

The magistrate undertook a pre-trial review of the sufﬁciency of the evidencel and
dismissed the charge ofunlawful

29.)

On

arrest.

(5/18/18 Tr., p. 9, L. 9

— p.

11, L. 25; R., pp.

228-

intermediate appeal the district court determined that the evidence supported the

charge and therefore the magistrate erred. (R., pp. 309-352.)

On appeal Kagarice contends

he was legitimately enforcing the city nuisance ordinance when he demanded Madsen
provide her

last

name, and therefore

his arrest

0f her for refusing t0 provide

and there was no basis for charging him with making an unlawful
brief, pp. 9-14.)

Kagarice’s argument

fails

because, as determined

it

(Appellant’s

arrest.

by the

was lawﬁJI

district court

intermediate appeal, the evidence that Will ultimately be submitted t0 a jury

is

on

sufﬁcient t0

support the charge 0f unlawful arrest.

B.

Standard

On

Of Review

review of a decision rendered by a

district court in its

intermediate appellate

capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s decision.”

DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 71

1,

184 P.3d 215, 217

(Ct.

App. 2008)

(citing

State V.

Losser

V.

Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). If the district court properly applied the

1

A

misdemeanor defendant, unlike a felony defendant,

probable cause determination such as

is

made

at a

is

not entitled t0 a contested

preliminary hearing.

State V.

Hogan,

132 Idaho 412, 415, 973 P.2d 764, 767 (Ct. App. 1999). As Will be addressed further in
Section II, below, a probable cause determination plays a much more limited role in a

misdemeanor charge than in a felony charge. This case should have proceeded t0 trial and
it was error for the magistrate t0 usurp the jury’s function of determining Whether Kagarice
was guilty 0r not guilty in this case.

law

to the facts the appellate court will

afﬁrm the

LLser, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls

EQ

district court’s order.

(citing

102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137

V. Blaser,

(1981)).

An appellate court “freely reviews the interpretation of a statute and its
t0 the facts.”

St.

Luke’s Reg’l Med.

Bd. of Comm’rs of Ada Ctv., 146 Idaho

Ctr., Ltd. V.

753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009). This standard applies both

0n

its

face and

The

C.

when

District

it is

application

ambiguous and requires statutory

When

the statute

is

plain

interpretation. Li.

Court Properly Concluded That The Evidence

Would Support

A

Conviction For Unlawful Arrest

The relevant language of

the illegal arrest statute provides that a police ofﬁcer

“who, under the pretense or color of any process 0r other legal authority,

.

.

.

Without a regular process or other lawful authority therefor,

LC.

§ 18-703.

The

statute articulates

requirement of a mental state of
negligence

is

no mental

guilty of a

is

state element,

at least criminal negligence.

arrests

any person

misdemeanor.”

but Idaho law imputes a

I.C. § 18-1 14.

“Criminal

gross negligence, such negligence as amounts to a wanton, ﬂagrant, or

reckless disregard of consequences or wilful indifference of the safety or rights 0f others.”

State V. Taylor, 59 Idaho 724, 87 P.2d 454,

459 (1939). Because there

is

Kagarice arrested Madsen under color 0f legal authority, the only question
arrest

was “without

is

it

residence

whether the

must be based on probable cause.”

Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 816, 203 P.3d 1203, 1215 (2009). Kagarice arrested

resisting

that

lawful authority” and with willful indifference t0 Madsen’s rights.

“For an arrest to be considered lawﬁll,
V.

no doubt

and obstructing for refusing

when ordered to d0

t0 provide her last

so. (R., p. 23.)

name and

m

Madsen for

refusing t0 leave her

A person commits this misdemeanor ofresist

and obstruct when she

“resists, delays 0r obstructs

any public ofﬁcer,

attempt t0 discharge, of any duty of his ofﬁce.”
elements: “(1) the person

Who was

ofﬁcer; (2) the defendant

knew

knew

at the

Mp, 146 Idaho

was a

This crime has three

delayed 0r obstructed was a law enforcement

that the person

was an

ofﬁcer; and (3) the defendant also

time of the resistance that the ofﬁcer was attempting t0 perform some ofﬁcial

act 0r duty.” State V.

i_n

resisted,

I.C. § 18-705.

in the discharge, or

Adams, 138 Idaho 624, 629, 67 P.3d
at

816, 203 P.3d at 1215. There

is

103, 108 (Ct. App. 2003),

in this case

police ofﬁcer and so identiﬁed himself to Madsen.

acting without legal authority and in willful indifference t0

“The term

‘duty’ in section

of a public ofﬁcer.”

m,

no dispute that Kagarice

The

Kagarice was “attempting t0 perform some ofﬁcial act or duty”

gm

issue

is

thus Whether

or, t0 the contrary,

Madsen’s

rights.

18—705 includes only those lawful and authorized

146 Idaho

omitted).

“Because an unlawful act

individual

may

is

at 817,

203 P.3d

at

was

acts

1216 (internal quotations

not considered a ‘duty’ under the statute, an

peacefully obstruct 0r reﬁlse to obey an ofﬁcer's unlawful act Without

Violating the statute.”

The evidence

Mp, 146 Idaho

at 817,

203 P.3d

in this case is sufﬁcient to

at

1216.2

have a jury resolve the question of

Kagarice’s guilt 0r innocence. Speciﬁcally, whether Kagarice lacked the legal authority t0

Madsen t0 reveal her last name

order

to believe

2

It

Madsen was

also appears that

0r exit her house, and therefore lacked probable cause

resisting or obstructing a lawful

Madsen

and authorized act when she

did not use force or Violence t0 resist Kagarice.

(Compare

23 (Madsen resisted by not giving name, initially refusing to leave house When
ordered, “physically [resisted] and pulled away” When Kagarice attempted to handcuff her,
and then, after her arrest, “screamed and thrashed” as Kagarice took her t0 the patrol car)

R., p.

ﬂ

Bishop, 146 Idaho 817-18, 203 P.3d

illegal search

was not

at

1216-17 (passive non—cooperation With the

resisting or obstructing).)

6

refused t0 provide her

name

disregard of Madsen’s rights.

or exit her house, and Whether Kagarice acted in willful

Review of the record and

shows

applicable law

that a jury

should decide whether Kagarice with criminal negligence unlawfully arrested Madsen.

Kagarice was ostensibly enforcing the Houser City nuisance ordinance.3
ordinance provides that nuisances include “unnecessary noises.”

(HC

That

3-1-1(E).)

If

an

ofﬁcer “ﬁnds that a nuisance exists,” he will serve a “written notice to abate 0r request a
hearing” on “the owner, agent or occupant of the property on Which the nuisance

(HC

located.”

3-1-3(B).)

The notice includes an “order

t0 abate,” as well as additional

information about the nuisance and the consequences of failing t0 abate the nuisance.
3-1—3(C).)

The notice

States mail, 0r

misdemeanor

by posting such notice

is

Applying
that

be served personally, where
t0 abate

to Violate the nuisance chapter

and any appeal

shows

“shall

exhausted.”

this

law

0n the premises.” (HC 3-1-3(D).)
t0

abate

is

It is

a

served

3-1-7 (emphasis added).)

may have had

was going

(HC

by certiﬁed United

0f the code “after a notice

off,

based 0n the evidence)

Kagarice in the execution 0f a lawful and

resist or obstruct

authorized duty. Although he

it

practical,

t0 the facts (0r at least the potential facts

Madsen did not

alarm going off when

(HC

is

a duty to investigate the nuisance of the car

once the alarm was

silent the

nuisance was abated.

There was no lawful reason for Kagarice t0 be attempting to serve a notice t0 abate an
already abated nuisance.

Even

if

he could lawfully serve a notice to abate the already

abated nuisance, he did not need Madsen’s

3

No

copy 0f the ordinance was presented

last

name (which was not part 0f the notice) nor

to the respective

took notice of it. The state has n0 objection t0
appears

on-line:

lower courts, which apparently

Court considering the ordinance as it
https://www.sterlingcodiﬁers.com/codebook/index.php?book id=869.
this

For ease of reference, a copy of the relevant section as found on-line
brief. The City of Houser Code will be cited herein as “HC.”
7

is

attached t0 this

to

have her

exit the

house in order to do

so.

Finally, because a

misdemeanor by deﬁnition

could not occur until both a notice t0 abate had been served and the abatement had not in
fact

happened, he was not lawfully investigating any crime. In short, Madsen’s refusal t0

provide her

last

name

0r exit her house in n0

way

resisted 0r obstructed Kagarice in the

exercise 0f a lawful duty. Kagarice therefore lacked any legitimate claim t0 probable cause

t0

make an

he did

arrest

0n

that charge

and acted With

willful disregard 0f Madsen’s rights

when

so.

Kagarice argues that an ofﬁcer

may

require identiﬁcation as part of a legitimate

criminal investigation. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9- 1 4.)

The

state generally

concurs that under

certain circumstances, such as the presence of reasonable suspicion to believe an offense

has been committed, an ofﬁcer

documentation.

E

State V.

may demand that a suspect produce identiﬁcation and other

Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 495, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (1992) (“a

police ofﬁcer's brief detention of a driver to run a status check

making a

valid, lawﬁJI contact

amendment”).

With the driver,

However, an ofﬁcer

reasonable suspicion or

some

may

not

is

driver's license, after

reasonable for purposes 0f the fourth

demand

identiﬁcation in the absence 0f

other reasonable need t0 detain the person.

140 Idaho 841, 845, 103 P.3d 454, 458 (2004) (“the
to

0n the

Ofﬁcer Marshall showed n0 compelling need

totality

E

State V. Page,

0fthe circumstances presented

to seize the identiﬁcation

and conduct a

warrants check; nor were there facts present that legitimized the detention 0f Page once the

ofﬁcer determined, pursuant t0 his community caretaker function, that Page was not in

need 0f assistance”). Indeed, absent some legal justiﬁcation

to detain a person, that

should be “free t0 disregard the police and go about his business.” State

Idaho 610, 613, 7 P.3d 219, 222 (2000).

In this case,

V.

person

Nickel, 134

Madsen should have been

free t0

disregard Kagarice’s demands for identification because he lacked reasonable suspicion to
detain her or otherwise lawfully command she provide her last name.
Kagarice, however, argues that he was properly investigating a violation of the
nuisance ordinance, HC 3-1-7, or lawfully serving a notice to abate under HC 3-1-3(B).
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.) Specifically, he argues that, under the circumstances, “it was
perfectly reasonable for Corporal Kagarice to conclude it was at least possible that a notice
to abate under the Ordinance had been previously issued” or that he would still be required
to “issue such notice as a warning against future violations.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)
This argument does not withstand scrutiny.
First, there is nothing in the record suggesting that Kagarice believed that “it was
at least possible” a notice had previously been issued. Whether Kagarice was legitimately
investigating whether a notice had been issued was, at best, an issue for trial. Second, as
set forth above and as determined by the district court, neither the notice nor the
misdemeanor provisions of the ordinance applied to a nuisance that was already abated.
There is no reason to believe that Kagarice was conducting a legitimate investigation of
the nuisance ordinance because that ordinance had no application under the facts. Finally,
even if learning Madsen’s last name were a legitimate area of inquiry into a suspected
nuisance violation, Kagarice makes no argument how Madsen’s refusal to provide her last
name in fact resisted, obstructed, or delayed him.
The magistrate concluded that Kagarice’s arrest of Madsen for resisting and
obstructing for not providing her last name was lawful, and thus the state could not prove
he was guilty of unlawful arrest. The district court properly concluded that the nuisance
ordinance did not apply to the already abated nuisance, and therefore Kagarice was not

9

exercising a lawful duty

when he demanded that Madsen provide

her

last

name. Kagarice

has failed to show error in the district court’s determination that the charge of unlawful
arrest

was improperly dismissed.

II.

The

District Court Correctly

Reversed The Magistrate Because Dismissal Of The Charge
Sanction As A Matter Of Fact And Law

Was An Improper
A.

Introduction

The magistrate

also dismissed the complaint as a sanction for including in the

afﬁdavit of probable cause in this case an unsigned probable cause order from Madsen’s

of a copy of the signed order. (5/18/18

resisting case instead

R., pp. 228-29.)

(R., pp. 352-62.)

The

district court

Tr., p. 12, L.

7

— p.

14, L. 12;

found this sanction erroneous both factually and

Speciﬁcally, the district court concluded there

is

legally.

nothing on this record

indicating that inclusion of the unsigned proposed order caused the magistrate reviewing

the probable cause afﬁdavit in this case t0 conclude that probable cause

in

had not been found

Madsen’s case or otherwise affected the probable cause ﬁnding, and therefore there was

no showing of prejudice from the omission.

(Id.)

Application 0f the law t0 the facts in the

record shows the district court correctly concluded there was n0 prejudice justifying the
sanction of dismissal.

B.

Standard

On

Of Review

review of a decision rendered by a

district court in its

intermediate appellate

capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s decision.”

DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 71

1,

184 P.3d 215, 217

(Ct.

App. 2008)

(citing

State V.

Losser

V.

Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). If the district court properly applied the

10

law

to the facts the appellate court will

afﬁrm the

EQ

district court’s order.

(citing

Losser, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls V. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137

(1981)).

The District Court Correctly Held That The Magistrate Court Abused Its Discretion

C.

Dismissal as a sanction for governmental misconduct
less drastic alternatives are not available.” State V. Arrasmith,

33, 45 (Ct.

App. 1998) (Violation 0f duty

prejudice t0 the defendant

criminal charges.

is

is

appropriate “only where

132 Idaho 33, 45, 966 P.2d

to disclose exculpatory evidence).

Thus,

a requirement of a proper exercise of discretion in dismissing

ﬂ, gg, State V. Cochran, 129 Idaho 944, 949—50, 935 P.2d 207, 212—

13 (Ct. App. 1997). “Generally, prosecutorial misconduct Will require dismissal only when

it

reaches the level 0f a constitutional due process Violation.”

Idaho 230, 237, 743 P.2d 459, 466 (1987). This

and should be exercised only
defendant has a heavy burden.”

As

in

State V.

so because “dismissal

is

is

Edmonson, 113
a drastic

remedy

extreme and outrageous situations, and therefore, the

Li

the district court concluded, the usual practice in Kootenai

County

is

to submit

a proposed order ﬁnding probable cause With the probable cause afﬁdavit. (R., p. 352.

alﬂ

R., p. 27.)

order.

The magistrate may

(R., pp. 352-53.)

sign, not sign, or alter before signing the

The probable cause afﬁdavit submitted

the police report prepared

by Detective Duncan.

included the following attachments t0

it

(R., pp.

Idaho State Police requesting an investigation

(R., p. 12.)

in this case incorporates

The police

The probable cause afﬁdavit with

report, in turn

letter

106); Kagarice’s report

incident (R., pp. 23-31); and transcripts 0f interviews With Kagarice and

3 1-102).

proposed

15-16 (noting attachments)): the
(R., p.

E

Madsen

by

0n the
(R., pp.

the unsigned order appears in the attachment

11

related t0 Kagarice’s police report.

copies 0f the

Thus,

(R., pp. 23-30.)

Madsen probable cause

it

appears that the reason the

afﬁdavit included in the Kagarice probable cause

afﬁdavit did not contain the magistrate’s signature

is

because the copies came from police,

rather than court, ﬁles.

Attaching a copy of the Madsen probable cause afﬁdavit from the police ﬁles
instead of the court ﬁles did not prejudice Kagarice and merited n0 sanction,

sanction of dismissal. First, Kagarice

was apparently never in custody.
the probable cause

that

(R., p. 111.5)

ﬁnding because

that

into court instead

of arrested,4 and

Thus, Kagarice suffered n0 detriment from

ﬁnding did not

result in his arrest or a requirement

he post bond. I.C.R. 4(b) (the court “may issue a summons requiring the defendant to

appear before the court
there

is

was summonsed

much less the

is

at a

time certain Without ﬁrst making a determination 0f Whether

probable cause”), 5(0) (probable cause determination required before a “defendant

retained, ordered into custody or required to post bond”); I.M.C.R. 3(0) (incorporating

I.C.R. 4, 5). In fact, Kagarice

had been found. I.C.R.

was

in the exact

same circumstances

5(0) (if n0 probable cause

as if n0 probable cause

found court should release defendant on

own

recognizance but not dismiss complaint). Even

case

was somehow inﬂuenced by the attachment of the unsigned probable cause order from

Madsen’s

case, Kagarice suffered

Second, as found by the

if the

probable cause ﬁnding in this

n0 conceivable prejudice.
district court,

nothing in this record suggests that the

probable cause ﬁnding in this case was inﬂuenced in any

4

way by attaching the copy of the

The state speciﬁcally requested a summons instead 0f an arrest warrant. (R., p. 10.)
The record shows that the only bond posted in this case related to the costs of appeal. (R.,
pp. 2, 366.) Nothing in the record demonstrates other than that Kagarice was out on his
own recognizance at all times during the pendency of this case.
5

12

Kagarice afﬁdavit that did not bear the magistrate’s signature 0n the order.
62.)

Simply

stated, in context the lack

(R., pp.

352-

of a signature on the copy did not lead to the

inference that the magistrate had found n0 probable cause in Madsen’s case, or that such a

ﬁnding somehow negated a ﬁnding 0f probable cause

in this case.

Kagarice argues that the inclusion of an unsigned copy of the proposed order was
a Brady6 Violation. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-16.)

establish a

because

it

Brady

Violation, there

either

is

It

must be evidence

was

not,

by

deﬁnition. “In order t0

that (1) is favorable to the

exculpatory or impeaching; (2) was willfully or inadvertently

suppressed by the State; and (3) was prejudicial 0r material in that there
probability that

its

accused

disclosure to the accused

would have

is

led to a different result.”

Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 503, 399 P.3d 804, 830 (2017).

m

a reasonable

The argument

that the

prosecution had a duty to disclose the existence 0f the signed order to Kagarice prior to an

ex parte probable cause determination which occurred before Kagarice even appeared in
the case

is

unsupported by any law.

Even accepting and assuming
evidence presented

at the

that Kagarice

had some due process

ex parte probable cause determination, and that the prosecution

was thereby obliged to submit the signed order, such does not rise t0
a sanction 0f dismissal. The remedy for a Brady Violation

is

prejudice),

interest in the

and not dismissal. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho

at

is

the level 0f supporting

generally a

new trial

45—46, 966 P.2d

at

(if there

45—46. T0

grant dismissal for non-disclosure at an ex part6 probable cause determination Where that

remedy would be inappropriate

6

for non-disclosure for trial is unwarranted.

Brady V. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
13

Kagarice argues

that,

but for the submission 0f the unsigned order, n0 order ﬁnding

probable cause would have been entered in this case, he would not have been “charged
7

with a misdemeanor offense,’ and that the omission was “material, deliberate, and/or
reckless.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 15 (internal quotations omitted).) This argument greatly

exaggerates What was
If a magistrate

at stake in the

ex parte probable cause determination.

does not ﬁnd probable cause “[a]t 0r before the ﬁrst appearance 0f

a defendant,” the “defendant must be released on the defendant’s

I.C.R. 5(0).

recognizance.”

However, “the complaint must not be dismissed pending a determination or

disposition.”

superﬂuous,

own

Id.

was

In this case, therefore, the probable cause ﬁnding

at least as far as

found n0 probable cause in

entirely

prejudicing Kagarice. First, if the magistrate in this case had

this case

based 0n the

fact that a different magistrate

with

incomplete facts had found probable cause t0 arrest Madsen, that magistrate would have

been in

error.

(E

s_um,

pp., 4-9 (articulating

demonstrated the need t0 try

this case

magistrate’s contrary conclusion).)

and

Why

why

the district court properly reversed the

Second, a ﬁnding 0f n0 probable cause

would not have resulted in dismissal 0fthe complaint.
the requirement to release the defendant

Kagarice,

Who was

has failed t0 show any prejudice,

at all

case

I.C.R. 5(0) (emphasis added). Third,

times released on his

no detrimental

much

in this

on his own recognizance would not have beneﬁted

never arrested and was

In other words, Kagarice suffered

the afﬁdavit of probable cause

effects

less the sort

own

recognizance.

from the alleged omission. He

of prejudice that would result in a due

process Violation requiring dismissal ofhis case because a fair

trial

was n0 longer possible.

Inclusion of the unsigned order attached to Kagarice’s afﬁdavit did not prejudice

Kagarice.

It

was

irrelevant to the question

0f Whether he could get a

14

fair trial.

He

suffered

no demonstrable prejudice. The

district court correctly

reversed the magistrate because of

an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The

Court t0 afﬁrm the

state respectfully requests this

district court’s appellate

decision reversing the magistrate’s order of dismissal.

DATED this 24th day 0f June, 2019.

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 24th day of June, 2019, served a true and
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by
means 0f iCourt File and Serve:
I

correct

JOSEPH R. SULLIVAN
Sullivan Law Ofﬁce, PLLC
Joe@ Sullivanlaw.us

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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Chapter

1

of 3

1

NUISANCES
3-1 -1:

NUISANCE DEFINED:

Whatever

an obstruction to the free use of property, so as
essentially to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a "nuisance". For
purposes of this chapter nuisances are:
injurious to the senses, or

is

A. Animals:

diseased animals running at

1.

Diseased:

2.

Carcasses: Carcasses of animals not disposed of within twenty four (24) hours after
death, as provided by law.

B. Condition

All

large.

Of Property:

1.

Refuse, Garbage: Accumulations of refuse or garbage.

2.

Discarded, Junked Items: Accumulations of discarded orjunked items creating an
unsightly appearance.

3.

Unreasonable, Unlawful Condition: Any unreasonable or unlawful condition or use of
premises or of building exteriors which, by reason of its appearance as viewed at
ground level from public streets or from neighboring premises, is detrimental to the
property of others.

4.

Places In Disrepair: All places in such a state of disrepair as to constitute a
an attractive nuisance or a hazard of any sort.

C. Noxious

D.

Weeds:

All

fire

hazard,

noxious weeds and other rank growth upon public or private property.

Smoke, Fumes: Dense smoke, noxious fumes, gas and soot

0r Cinders

in

unreasonable

quanﬁﬁes.

E. Noise, Vibrations: All

unnecessary noises and annoying vibrations.

https ://www. sterlingcodiﬁers.com/codebooldprintnowphp
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F. Obstructions,

Excavations: Obstructions and excavations affecting the ordinary use by the

public of streets, alleys, sidewalks or public grounds, except under such conditions as

are provided by ordinance.

G. Motor Vehicles: Allowing disabled, partially assembled or disassembled motor vehicles to
remain upon private property for more than thirty (30) days.

H.

Abandoned

abandoned, unattended or discarded iceboxes, refrigerators
lid, snap lock or other locking device which may
not be released from the inside, upon public or private property. (2004 Code)
Refrigerators: All

or other containers which have a door or

3-1 -2:

The

NUISANCES PROHIBITED:

creation or maintenance of a nuisance

3-1 -3:

is

prohibited within the

city.

(2004 Code)

NOTICE TO ABATE:

A. Definition: For purposes of this chapter, "person" includes any individual, firm,
corporation, trust, any other organized group or any governmental entity.

Required: Whenever the mayor, City clerk or law enforcement agency finds that a
nuisance exists, he shall cause to be served upon the owner, agent or occupant of the
property on which the nuisance is located, or upon the person causing or maintaining the
nuisance, a written notice to abate or to request a hearing as provided in section 3w1~6 of

B. Notice

this chapter.

C. Contents
1.

Of Notice: The notice

to

abate shall contain:

order to abate the nuisance or request a hearing as provided in section 3w1w6 of
this chapter within a stated time, which shall be reasonable under the circumstances.

An

2.

Location of nuisance,

3.

Description of what constitutes the nuisance.

4.

Statement 0f act or acts necessary to abate the nuisance.

5.

Statement that

made

if

stationary.

not abated as directed and no request for hearing is
within the time prescribed, the city will abate the nuisance and assess the cost
if

the nuisance

is

against such person.
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D.

be served personally, where practical, by
certified United States mail, or by posting such notice to abate on the premises. Return of
service shall be made as provided by law for returns of personal service. (2004 Code)

Method Of Service: The notice

3-1 -4:

to

abate

shall

ABATEMENT BY CITY:

abate the nuisance as directed, the mayor or
the nuisance to be abated, keeping an accurate
account of the expenses incurred. The expense account shall be fully itemized, verified and
filed with the city clerk. Such expenses shall be paid by the city. (2004 Code)
If

the person so notified neglects or

other officer

3-1 -5:

The

initiating

the notice,

fails to

may cause

COLLECTION OF COSTS:

mail a statement of the total cost to the person failing to abide by the
notice to abate and, if the amount shown by the statement has not been paid within thirty
city clerk shall

he shall pursue the levy
50—1008. (2004 Code)
(30) days,

3-1 —6:

of

an assessment as provided by Idaho Code 50-334 and

REQUEST FOR HEARING; CITY COUNCIL DECISION:

abate a nuisance may have a hearing with the city
council as to whether a nuisance exists. A request for hearing must be made in writing
and delivered to the officer ordering the abatement, or it will be conclusively presumed
that a nuisance exists and it must be abated as ordered. See subsection 34—4301 of this

A. Request:

Any person ordered

to

chapter relating to the time for requesting the hearing.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the city council shall render a
written decision as to whether a nuisance exists. If it finds that a nuisance exists, it must
be ordered to be abated within an additional time which must be reasonable under the

B. City Council Decision:

circumstances. (2004 Code)

3-1 -7:

PENALTY:

any of the provisions of this chapter, after a notice to abate is served
and any appeal is exhausted, shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor and
punished as provided in the general penalty in section ”3‘44 of this code. Every day any
condition is allowed to exist which is in violation ofthis chapter shall be a distinct and

Any person

violating

separate offense. (2004 Code)
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